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Computers as Agents: A Proposed
Approach to Revised U.C.C. Article 2
JoHN P. FISCHER*

INTRODUCTION
Developments in the ongoing computer revolution have called into question
long-standing principles in many areas of law. As early as 1985, national and
international bodies concerned with trade and the sale of goods were studying the
potential impact that computer technology might have on the behavioral patterns
of commercial actors. In the last decade, as the various bodies have formulated
the legal responses, advancements in computer technology, and its potential as
a powerful tool of trade, have exploded. Future growth in electronic technology,
including electronic data interchange, is not expected to slow as more companies
save money and increase efficiency through innovative use of computer
technology.
This Note will explore this country's current legal response to the use of.
computer technology in the law of the sale of goods. The most recent response
as of this writing is a draft version of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") dated July 12-19, 1996.' Many of the proposed revisions to Article
2 on the sale of goods treat the issue of electronic contract formation. Computer
transmission of data in electrical impulses is calling into question the
fundamental assumption of a paper writing as necessary for commerce; the

* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. The author
wishes to thank Professor Bruce A. Markell for his advice and assistance in developing a topic
and overseeing the writing of this Note, and Professor Sarah J. Hughes, who offered useful
suggestions during the editing process.
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (199_) [draft]
(visited Sept. 24, 1996) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/ucc2sale.htm>
[hereinafter July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft]. Actually, a later draft, dated August 1, 1996 has been
released by the Uniform Law Commissioners. However, the provisions relating to electronic
contracting are not contained in the August 1 draft. Rather, the reader is referred to the
electronic contracting provisions in the emerging draft of Article 2B on licenses, the most
recent draft having been released on September 4, 1996. AMERICAN LAW INSTITE, Uniform
Commercial Code Art. 2B Licenses Sept. 4, 1996 Draft (visited Sept. 24, 1996)
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/art2b996.htm> [hereinafter Sept. 4 Art. 2B Draft].
The August 1 draft of Article 2 refers the reader in some places to some future unspecified draft
of Article 2B, and in other places to the most recent extant draft of Article 2B, which was, at
the time of the August 1 Article 2 draft, dated July 12-19, 1996. Because it is unclear which
of the Article 2B draft provisions the August version of Article 2 intended to adopt, and
because Article 2B itself is in a considerable state of flux, the Author has chosen to work with
the Article 2 provisions as they appear in the July 12-19 draft of Article 2 on Sales. These
provisions have remained substantively unchanged since the October 1, 1995 draft of Article
2, with the exception of the drafters' addition of the definition of "electronic agent." These
provisions are also substantively similar to their analogues in the last two drafts of Article 2B.
Thus, whatever set of electronic contracting provisions are ultimately selected, the principles
discussed herein will likely be applicable barring a radical change in approach by the drafters.
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capacity of computers to monitor inventory and send out purchase orders without
human awareness is calling into question the assumption that parties must be
aware that they are completing binding contracts with one another.
This Note contends that the law's response to the technology that has shaken
these fundamental assumptions may still be best understood with reference to
long-standing, familiar legal principles. The extension of these principles to
cover new technological developments makes sense as an attempt to deal with
technology which, while novel, nevertheless serves the identical functions that
have been served in more traditional ways in the past. To that end, this Note will
argue that the legal concepts of "writing" and "signature" need not be drastically
modified to encompass electronic transmissions. Likewise, lawmakers need only
slightly expand the concepts of agency and the capacity of agents to bind their
principals to cover those situations in which computers have the ability to enter
into binding contracts on behalf of their parties without any human knowledge
of the agreement having been made. By extending long-standing legal principles
to encompass new situations, lawmakers may foster continuity in the law, which
may assist commercial actors, their attorneys, and judges in grasping the
consequences of the new technology. By avoiding the promulgation of wholly
new regulations covering electronic contracting, drafters may also avoid
unforeseen consequences as a result of laws different from anything that has
come before. This Note demonstrates that the provisions chosen by the drafters
of the revised Article 2 reach the same result, whether intentionally or not, as
application of the long-standing legal principles of writing, signature, and agency
to electronic contracting would reach. Indeed, since the July 12-19 draft of
Article 2, the drafters have begun to recognize that computers may serve as
agents. This Note urges that the concept of electronic agency be made even more
explicit in Article 2 to foster greater understanding of the consequences of the
provisions.
Part I of this Note explains the continuing development of electronic data
interchange as a means of creating commercial agreements, and summarizes the
history of the legal community's various proposed responses to the issue of
electronic contracting, culminating in the July 12-19, 1996 draft of Article 2. Part
II discusses in greater detail two of the proposed provisions in Article 2. Part III
examines several agency principles in the computer context. Part IV applies these
agency principles to selected provisions of the July 12-19, 1996 draft of Article
2. Finally, Part V addresses some problems inherent in the agency paradigm.
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I. ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE

A. Background

Electronic data interchange ("EDT') is "the computer-to-computer transmission
of data in a standardized format."2 The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), however, suggests a broader definition
of EDI, one that includes free-form (non-standardized) communications, such as
electronic mail, as well as all "electronic commerce" generally
In the past decade, many national and international bodies have given
considerable attention to formulating appropriate legal responses to EDI. 4 They

2. Report of the Working Group on ElectronicDataInterchange (EDI)on the Work of Its

Twent,-fifth Session, [1993] 24 UNCITRAL Y.B. at 193, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/373 [hereinafter
1993 Yearbook]. Most scholars have adopted definitions that are substantively the same; that
is, they all include the elements of computer-to-computer transmission and all stress the use
of a standardized format to the transmissions. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, The EmergingLaw
ofInternationalElectronic Commerce, 6 TEPv. INT'L & CoM. L.J. 293, 294 (1992); Electronic
Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange-A
Report and Model Trading PartnerAgreement, 45 Bus. LAw. 1645, 1649-50 (1990)
[hereinafter Report and Model Agreement].

3. 1993 Yearbook, supra note 2, at 193. The Report provides two reasons why such an
expanded definition is desirable. The first is that commercial actors in practice use standardized
electronic media in essentially the same way that they use, in ever greater numbers, free-form
electronic media. Given this practice, it makes more sense and is more efficient to allow one
set of rules to govern all electronic media, rather than have several different sets of rules for
practices that, for a commercial actor, are functionally the same. The second reason that
UNCITRAL urges a broader definition is its desire to create rules open enough to encompass
unforeseen future technological developments when they arise. Id This has likewise been a
primary goal of the U.C.C. since its inception. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1994) ("This Act is
drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of
legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices."). The
July 12-19, 1996 draft of Article 2 adopts this broad definition, stating: "['Electronic message'
includes] electronic data interchange and electronic mail." July 12-19 Draft, supra note 1, §
2-102(20). The September 4, 1996 draft of Article 2B has gone even further, adding to the list
of technologies "facsimile, telex, and like communication." Sept. 4 Art. 2B Draft,supra note
1, § 2B-102(14). As the draft reporter notes, "[the expansion of the definition] attempts to deal
with the breadth of alternatives that may ultimately [be]come available." Id at Reporter's Note
12. The importance of the drafters' sensitivity to the changing needs of business will be a
consideration of this Note as it analyzes the way in which the drafters of revised Article 2 have
chosen to deal with EDI in the area of contract formation..
4. A partial list of these bodies includes UNCITRAL, the ABA Section of Business Law,
the United Nations Economic Conference for Europe Working Party on Facilitation of
International Trade Procedures, the United Kingdom EDI Association, the EDI Council of
Canada, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Jeffrey B. Ritter, Scope
of the Uniform CommercialCode: Computer ContractingCases and Electronic Commercial

Practices,45 Bus. LAw. 2533, 2537 n.14 (1990); Richard B. Kelly, Comment, The CMI
Charts a New Course on the Sea ofElectronicDataInterchange:Rulesfor ElectronicBills of
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have scrutinized every facet of electronic contracting, with primary focus on
three aspects of EDI. The first significant aspect of EDI is its use as a quicker,
more efficient substitute for more traditional media of communication, such as
paper writings, telegraphs, or even faxes. In this capacity, commercial actors use
EDI to perform precisely the same functions that older media formerly
performed.5 The second aspect of EDI, one that goes beyond the functions of
older media, is its capacity to form contractual relations between two parties
without the awareness or input of human agents of the parties.6 In this capacity,
a computer is responsible for all aspects of contract formation, including sending
out electronic purchase orders, checking electronic confirmatory memoranda to
ensure they conform with the terms of the agreement, and even transferring
payment to the other party! No human agent of either party need be conscious
of any particular order.8 The third aspect of EDI upon which rulemaking bodies
have focused is the growth of third party service providers which serve as

Lading, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 349, 350 n.7 (1992).

5. Among these functions is the evidentiary one for purposes of the (perhaps) soon-to-berepealed statute of frauds in Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1994). For a discussion of how EDI
might fulfill this function, see discussion infra part II.A.
6. This aspect of EDI has garnered the most attention from the drafters of proposed
Articles 2 and 2B. As the Reporter's Notes for proposed Article 2B-205 discuss:
[A] contract exists even if no human being reviews or reacts to the electronic
message of the other or the information product delivered. This represents a
modem adaptation away from traditional norms of consent and agreement. In
electronic transactions, preprogrammed information processing systems can send
and react to messages without human intervention and, when the parties choose
to do so, there is no reason not to allow contract formation. A contract principle
that requires human assent would inject what might often be an inefficient and
error prone element in a modem format.
Sept. 4 Art. 2B Draft,supranote 1, § 2B-205 Reporter's Note 3.

7. See Boss, supra note 2, at 294. Indeed, besides this capability, EDI technology allows
commercial actors unprecedented access to information and an efficient means of performing
varied mundane tasks done manually until now. For example, a supplier of goods to a retailer
has the ability to communicate with the retailer's computer and discover exactly how many
products supplied by the supplier were actually sold, and at which outlets. Bill Bregar, Small
Molders Will Need Big Capabilities,PLAsTICS NEws, May 15, 1995, at 7. In addition,

commercial actors can use EDI for financial reporting, planning, pricing, and scheduling.
Getahn M. Ward, Firms Tell Suppliers to Trash Paper, Take Orders by Computer,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), July 16, 1995, at Cl, available in 1995 WL 9356250.

Businesses have begun to exploit the true potential of EDI. A supplier to, the Ford Motor
Company has implemented, using EDI, a six-month planning schedule which Ford updates
weekly based on changing needs. Bregar, supra,at 7.
8. A typical procedure is for a party to program its computer to monitor the party's
inventory. When the inventory dips below a ceitain level, or otherwise falls within certain

preprogrammed parameters, the computer sends an electronic purchase order to a supplier's
computer. That supplier may program its computer to process the information, send back an
acknowledgment, and send the buyer's computer the bill. Again, the supplier's computer may
be following preprogrammed instructions without receiving manually entered data for each
separate transaction. Amelia H. Boss et al., Scope ofthe Uniform CommercialCode: Advances
in Technology andSurvey of Computer ContractingCases, 44 Bus. LAW. 1671, 1673 (1989).
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archives and clearinghouses for electronic messages. 9 The first two aspects of
EDI are most relevant to issues of contract formation; these are the aspects
primarily addressed by proposed Article 2 of the U.C.C..
The use of EDI by commercial actors is growing: by the end of 1993, 10,000
companies were using ED! in the United States and Canada.'" The growth of EDI
is aided by manufacturers and large retailers, many of whom require trading
partners to either implement EDI technology or risk losing their account with the
manufacturer or retailer."
The growth of EDI is not expected to slow anytime soon. Primarily a
technology used for communications between commercial trading partners
today, 2 thirty-nine percent of Fortune 1000 companies will use EDI to
communicate with consumers by 1997, according to one estimate. 3 In addition,

9. One commentator compares third party providers to post offices. Ward, supranote 7.
Many of these providers "add value" to transmissions; that is, the provider will translate the
data from one type of system to another so that the trading partners may use the systems they
find best suited to their intra-firm needs and need not be concerned with their system's
incompatibility with other firms' systems. Id Providers that perform such translations are often
called value-added networks ("VANs"). Because the proposed Article 2 provision dealing with
VANs (called "intermediaries" in proposed § 2-213) is concerned with issues of who bears the
risk of an error by a VAN, and is not concerned with issues of contract formation, proposed §
2-213 is beyond the scope of this Note. July 12-19.Art. 2B Draft, supra note 1, § 2-213.
10. Boss, supranote 2, at n.4.
11. For example, among large retailers, K-Mart, Wal-Mart, and Target require their
suppliers to communicate with them via EDI. See Bregar, supranote 7, at 7; Ward, supranote
7. In addition, the "Big Three" automakers have implemented the same policy. See Boss, supra
note 2, at 295. Such policies have been referred to by smaller suppliers as "EDI or Die." Ward,
supranote 7. In 1992, conservative estimates put the number of Fortune 500 companies doing
business, or planning to start doing business, via EDI at 50%. Boss, supranote 2, at 294 n.4.
Despite such evidence of widespread EDI use, some of the smaller industries such as the gift
retailing industry have an EDI implementation rate of less than 1%. Liane McAllister,
Computer Use by Retailers Up, GIFTS AND DECORATIvE ACCEsSORIES, Sept. 1, 1995, at 44,
availablein 1995 WL 8557600. Part of the problem for these smaller industries is the high cost
of implementation. See generallyBregar, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining that while a basic EDI
package costs less than $5000, the cost rises when the firm integrates the system into its
existing systems), Without pressure from the large retailers, many small companies have chosen
not to avail themselves of this technology. Nevertheless, some analysts predict an EDI rate of
as high as 70% of all American businesses by the year 2000. Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, The
Application ofthe Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Fraudsto Electronic
Commerce, 13 J.L. &CoM. 143, 144 (1993).
12. See generally Report and Model Agreement, supra note 2, at 1645-53. The Report
frames all EDI issues exclusively in terms of business trading partners and indeed excludes
consumers from the ModelAgreement.
13. ForresterResearch: Businesses Are Not Just Surfing the Net, They're Diving In,
ForresterResearch Survey Finds,Bus. WIRE, Nov. 10, 1995, availablein WL, BUSWIRE
database.
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as evidence of savings in time, 4 money, inventory, 6 and labor" accumulates,
more companies will switch to EDI to take advantage of these savings.'
B. Legal Responses to EDI
The potential power of EDI technology to transform business practices was
recognized early by certain international bodies. As early as 1984, UNCITRAL
committed itself to. studying EDI and its effect on international trade, including
contract formation. 9 In the United States the following year, the Uniform
Commercial Code Committee formed an Ad Hoe Subcommittee on Scope of the
U.C.C. ("Ad Hoc Subcommittee") to study similar issues.2" These and other
bodies considered the effects that the developing technologies might have on
.existing business practices and what the law might do to accommodate new
practices that emerge, to replace the old. The Ad Hoc Subcommittee recognized
that in many ways the original drafters of the Code approached their job
"reactively" in the sense that the business practices upon which the Code was
based had been in place for years before its promulgation; the process of writing
the Code was in large part observing how commerce occurred and tailoring the
rules to these practices. 2' The Ad Hoc Subcommittee also realized that, in
studying an approaching technological revolution as it unfolded, they could
accomplish Code revisions "proactively"; that is, the rules could "help[] to
channel and direct activity in the best interests of [commercial actors]."22
Bolstering the Ad Hoc Subcommittee's decision to-not simply accommodate
existing business practices through law but to help shape emerging business
practices was the fact that commercial actors themselves expressed a desire for
some legal certainty in an area that had many unforeseeable legal variables.'

14. FedEx, for example, avoids manual entering of 400,000 airbills per day as a result of
'EDI. Ward, supra note 7.
15. Estimates of the amount of money saved range from $5to $50 per document depending
on the business and on the document. Boss, supra note 2, at 295 n.5.
16. EDI aids ajust-in-time inventory system and reduces the amount of inventory needed
on hand. DiPaolo, supra note 11, at 143.
17. Using EDI reduces the amount of keying and re-keying of data manually into the
computer; this allows human workers to focus their energies on higher-value labor while
simultaneously reducing the amount of error in data entry. Boss, supra note 2, at 294.
18. But see Paul Barker, Fear,Resistance HoldingBack ElectronicCommerce, COMPUrING
CANADA, June 21, 1995, at 36; Paul Taylor, Battle Is On to ControlAvalanche of Paper in the
Electronic Office, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 1, 1995, at Information Technology 1 (arguing
that society will not reap the predicted benefits of EDI, nor maximize its full potential, due to
security problems and social inertia in breaking old habits such as working with paper copies
of documents).
19. Report ofthe UnitedNations Commission on InternationalTrade Law, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 30, U.N. Doe. A/39/17 (1984).
20. Ritter, supra note 4, at 2534.
21. Boss et al., supra note 8, at 1672.
22. Id. at 1673.
23. Ritter, supra note 4, at 2535. Among the undetermined legal issues are uncertainty
about the enforceability of EDI contracts, see Boss, supra note 2, at 304, and the applicability
of the mailbox rule to instantaneous transmissions, infra part II.B.
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Risk-averse businesses are apt to hesitate at the implementation of EDI in the
absence of law on the enforceability of EDI contracts.24 Other commentators also
called for clear EDI rules, expressing concern that concepts like "writing" and
"signature," used in U.C.C. section 2-201, might become outdated. These
commentators argued that EDI would stretch such concepts past their capacity
and urged that newer, more inclusive concepts be adopted to replace them."
As a result of the above concerns, these and other committees have advanced
a wealth of solutions and proposals. In 1990 the Electronic Messaging Services
Task Force ("Task Force") presented The Commercial Use of ElectronicData
Interchange-A Report26 to the Subcommittee of Electronic Commercial
Practices and to what was, as of July, 1989, no longer an ad hoc subcommittee,
the Subcommittee on Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code. Surveying and
selecting the most effective parts of existing EDI agreements between trading
partners, the Task Force synthesized a model agreement for use by future trading
partners interested in minimizing the legal risks of converting to electronic
media. 7 The business community immediately embraced the Model Agreement,8
but as a complete approach to the topic of EDI, the Model Agreement was of
limited utility.29
Statutory guidance was thus the next step in the process, led by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Drafting Committee,
which promulgated U.C.C. Article 2B on licenses, and UNCITRAL's Working
Group on Electronic Data Interchange, which attempted uniform commercial
rules on EDI. Both efforts addressed issues of contract formation, and both
efforts influenced the most recent proposed revisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C.

24. However, the growing number of commercial actors that convert to EDI in the absence
of legal guidance, either of their own volition or because of an "EDI or Die" command, makes
it likely that risk-aversion in business is no longer that significant a factor in support of EDI
rules. Indeed, one commentator has noted that EDI has such great benefits that many
companies are willing to risk implementing it without a legal safety net to protect them. Boss,
supra note 2, at 302.
25. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Conceptsfor
CommercialLaw, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 607, 611 (1993). The policies behind this argument
and the opposing argument, that concepts such as "writing" can encompass EDI transmissions,
will be discussed infra in part II.A.
26. Report and ModelAgreement, supra note 2.
27. The Model ElectronicDataInterchange TradingPartnerAgreement and Commentary
appended to the Report appears at 45 Bus. LAW. 1717 (1990).
28. Ritter, supranote 4, at 2536.
29. Among other things, private agreements, whether based upon the ModelAgreement or
not, cannot bind parties not privy to the contract, cannot waive the requirements of § 2-201,
and provide no assistance to parties who fail to set up an agreement prior to an EDI
relationship. Boss, supra note 2, at 304.
30. The July 12-19, 1996 draft of revised Article 2 is the most recent draft available at the
time of this writing and is the basis for the substantive discussion to follow. As noted supra
note 1, even if the provisions in this draft version are substantially changed in the future, the
concepts discussed by this Note would apply to any further attempts to draft EDI rules.
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Briefly, the purposes of various proposed provisions of Article 2 are as
follows. 3' Proposed section 2-102 contains definitions of "electronic agent,"
"electronic message," "electronic transaction," "intermediary," "manifests
assent," "opportunity to feview," "record," and "signed."32 Proposed section 2201 (a) repeals the statute of frauds for the sale of goods.33 Proposed section 2208(a) alters the mailbox rule with regard to EDI; proposed section 2-208(b)
makes explicit the notion that commercial parties can form binding contracts
without any requirement of human awareness or assent. Proposed section 2-212
addresses the times when a party may fairly attribute a message received to the
party purporting to send it. Finally, proposed section 2-213 deals with
intermediaries between the parties in an electronic transaction.34
II. A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT "NEW" ARTICLE TWO

Most of the provisions dealing with electronic contract formation found in
proposed Article 2 may be explained in terms of agency law and the concept of
computer as agent, as is discussed in Part IV. The other proposed provisions
discussed here fall into two categories: those that deal with the U.C.C.
definitions of "writing" and "signature," and the one that reverses the traditional
mailbox rule as applied to EDI transactions.
A. Transmissionsas Writings
Three provisions in the July 12-19, 1996 draft of Article 2 deal with issues of
EDI transmissions as writings. These are proposed section 2-102(33) defining
"record"; proposed section 2-102(36) defining "sign"; and proposed section 2201 (a) repealing the statute of frauds.35 Two issues surrounding these provisions

31. Some of the following provisions are simple definitions, others form the basis upon
which the subsequent discussion is built, and still others are beyond the scope of this Note. The
current text of each relevant provision is set out at the point in the text where it is discussed.
32. "Manifests assent" and "opportunity to review" are carefully defined to exclude the
need for a showing of intent or awareness in the process of manifesting assent. See infra part
IV.C. "Record" and "signed" are pertinent to the inclusion of EDI transmissions in the concept
of "writing." See infra part II.A. The policies behind the definition of "electronic agent" and
the application of this concept to other Article 2 provisions are discussed infra parts 1U and IV.
33. An excellent survey of policies for and against the statute of frauds independent of the
impact of EDI transmissions on the rule can be found in John C. Ward & Kim J. Dockstader,
PlacingArticle 2's Statute of Fraudsin Its ProperPerspective, 27 IDAHO L. REv. 507 (199091). For purposes of this Note's discussion of § 2-201, only the applicability of the statute to
EDI transmissions is considered as an argument for or against its repeal.
34. This provision deals with the role that VANs or other providers play in the transaction
and the division of risk of irltermediary error between the parties. As stated supra note 9, such
considerations are beyond the scope of this Note.
35. Proposed § 2-102(33) reads: "'Record,' when used as a noun, means information that
is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form." July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft,supra note 1, § 2-102(33).
Proposed § 2-102(36) reads:
"Sign," when used as a verb, means to identify a record by means of any symbol
executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate the record.
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should be of interest to commercial actors. The first issue is the extent to which
Article 2 should extend concepts such as "writing" and "signed" to cover new
forms of media used by commercial actors in contract formation. The second
issue is whether Article 2 should repeal the statute of frauds.
As to the first issue, commentators have recently called for the law to accept
audiotape recordings as "signed writings" and to accept EDI transmissions as
"signed writings" for purposes of fulfilling the statute of frauds. 6 At least one
court has found the argument for audiotapes as writings persuasive.37 Such
arguments for expansion of the concepts of "signature" and "writing" follow
decades of liberal construction of the statute of frauds3" consistent with the
"flexibility" theme of the Code.39 Indeed, stored EDI transmissions serve the
purpose of a writing, "to require some objective guaranty, other than word of
mouth, that there
really has been some deal,"4' at least as well as paper records
4
'
of a contract.
Likewise, the signature requirement is broad enough to encompass EDI
technology. One of the Official Comments to the current version of section 2-201
states that "'signed' [is] a word which includes any authentication which
42
As noted above, courts have held this
identifies the party to be charged .... ,,
requirement met by any number of marks used to identify the sender. There are

"Signed" has an analogous meaning. An electronic record is a signed record if a
method of authentication identifying the originator of the record and indicating the
originator's approval of the information contained therein is used and that method
has been agreed on between the parties or was as reliable as [was] appropriate for
the purpose for which the record was generated or communicated in light of all the
circumstances.
Id. § 2-102(36).
Proposed § 2-201(a) reads: "A contract or modification thereof is enforceable, whether or
not there is a record signed by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even if the contract
or modification is not capable of performance within one year after its making." Id. § 2-201(a).
36. See generally Raj Bhala, A PragmaticStrategyfor the Scope of Sales Law, the Statute
of Frauds, and the Global Currency Bazaar, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 1, 29-38 (arguing for

acceptance of tape recordings); DiPaolo, supra note 11 (arguing for acceptance of EDI
transmissions).
37. Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972).
38. Among the instrumentalities held to be writings by various courts are telexes and tape
recordings. Courts have held markings as diverse as a company letterhead and a typewritten
name to be "signatures." DiPaolo, supra note 11, at 149, 152.
39. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1994).
40. DiPaolo, supra note 11, at 146 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum Replying to
the Report andMemorandum of Task Group I of the Special Committee of the Commerce and

Industry Association ofNew York, Inc., on the Uniform Commercial Code, in 1 NEw YORK
.STATE LAW REVISiON COMMISSION REPORT 106, 199 (1954)) (emphasis omitted).
41. Some common security measures for protecting the integrity of electronic messages
include the ability to create an audit trail of all alterations to a message and to "lock" a file and
prevent it from being altered. DiPaolo, supra note 11, at 148 (also noting that "paper.., is not
itself exceedingly reliable").

As to the durability of electronically stored data, it lasts "at least as long as the life of a piece
of paper." Fry, supra note 25, at 608.
42. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1994).
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several ways to authenticate an electronic message as well. Among these are
encryption, electronic measurement of the user's hand thickness, and retinal
scans.43 Currently, some of these methods, such as the retinal scan, are
prohibitively expensive for most commercial actors; however, even some of the
more affordable methods of authentication, such as encryption or code keys,
identify the sender of a message with greater reliability than, for example, a
company's letterhead stationery, which could easily be used to create a forgery.
Any definition of "signed" broad enough to encompass methods of
authentication that lack security, such as company letterhead, is surely broad
enough to include methods such as encryption that are at least as secure as
traditional signatures.
Some scholars, however, are concerned that the definitions of "writing" and
"signature" have become too attenuated and that the law calls upon the words to
support more weight than they were designed to bear." There is merit in this
contention, as the legal definition of what satisfies the "writing" and "signature"
requirements bears little resemblance to the common understanding of these
terms. Patricia Brumfield Fry, in an outstanding analysis,45 suggested (and the
proposed draft of Article 2 adopts) the term "record" as a substitute for and
enlargement upon the definition of writing. The reader will note that the
definition of "record" encompasses such things as audiotapes and EDI
transmissions much less clumsily than the current Code definition of "writing."46
The proposed definition of "signature," while retaining the same terminology as
the definition in the old Code, nevertheless gives the word a more expansive
definition.4 7 Perhaps changing the word "signature" to "authentication" would
even more thoroughly advance the principles behind changing the word "writing"
to "record." Whatever terminology the Code uses, however, it should be clear
that if the Code is responsive at all to the needs of commercial actors-and is to
remain true to its foundational principles as it surely must-it will adapt to
encompass these new technologies.
The second proposed development touching upon the issue of whether EDI
transmissions satisfy the statute of frauds is the proposed repeal of the statute
itself. There are legitimate reasons besides the expansion of technology and the
outdatedness of old conceptions of "writing" to do away with the statute.48 As
seen above, the liberal construction which courts traditionally apply to the statute
of frauds, and the proposed redefinition of "record" and "signature," practically
ensure that even if the drafters keep the statute of frauds, EDI transmissions will

43. DiPaolo, supranote 11, at 152-53.
44. Report andModelAgreement, supranote 2, at 1664 n.70 (comparing such attenuation
of legal provisions to a Procrustean bed, referring to the legendary giant, Procrustes, who, when
his guests did not fit the bed they were given, cut their limbs off or stretched them out so that
they would fit).
45. See generally Fry, supra note 25.
46. "'Written' or 'writing' includes printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction
to tangible form." U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1994).
47. Proposed § 2-102(36) appears in full supra note 35.
48. These other arguments for the abolition of the statute of frauds are considered, but
ultimately rejected, by Ward & Dockstader, supra note 33.

1997]

COMPUTERS AS AGENTS

satisfy it. Since EDI need not compel the repeal of the statute of frauds, and since
there are legitimate reasons independent of EDI to justify its repeal, one may
safely conclude that whether the statute of frauds stays or goes, the enforceability
of EDI contracts will not be influenced either way. The ultimate conclusion one
may draw from the provisions pertaining to EDI transmissions as evidencing a
contract is that the drafters have succeeded in isolating the instances in which
EDI serves the same purposes as paper writings and have subjected both EDI and
paper writings to virtually the same legal tests.
B. ProposedSection 2-208(a) and the Mailbox Rule
This proposed provision falls outside the analytical framework of this Note;
that is, it is not susceptible to interpretation by reference to either common law
principles of "writing" or "agency," but rather the principle of the "mailbox
rule." Nevertheless, some of the provisions discussed below, such as proposed
section 2-208(b), rely in part upon the application of this provision; thus the
discussion of it here.
To understand the choices made by proposed section 2-208(a)49 it is first
necessary to understand the purpose of "functional acknowledgments" in EDI
communication. The functional acknowledgment is a transmission that a party
who receives a message ("the receiver") sends to the party who initiated the
message ("the sender"). The functional acknowledgment has no substantive legal
effect, but instead is a way for the receiver to indicate receipt of a message. The
functional acknowledgment also contains information regarding the format and
syntax of the message as received and thus allows the sender, upon receipt of the
functional acknowledgment, to discover immediately whether the message the
receiver received indeed arrived exactly as transmitted." If the functional
acknowledgment checks out, the sender knows immediately that the receiver has
received the message; if the acknowledgment is'in any way inconsistent with the
message or if no acknowledgment arrives, the sender knows immediately that the
transmission was defective and can thus do something to correct it. The potential
of a functional acknowledgment to allow the sender to know immediately the
status of an electronic message has caused the drafters of proposed Article 2 to
reexamine the mailbox rule in the EDI context.
Proposed section 2-208(a) states that electronic acceptance of an offer does not
occur until the offeror receives the acceptance from the offeree.5 This rule
reverses the common law "mailbox rule" that states that an acceptance occurs
when the offeree sends it to the offeror, regardless of whether the offeror ever

49. Proposed § 2-208(a) reads as follows: "In an electronic transaction, if an electronic
message initiated by one party evokes an electronic message or other electronic response by
the other or its electronic agent, a contract is created when the initiating party receives a
message manifesting acceptance." July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft, supra note 1, § 2-208(a).
50. Report and Model Agreement, supra note 2, at 1669-70.
51. July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft, supra note 1, § 2-208(a).
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receives it. 2 The mailbox rule, however, applies only in those situations where
there is a "lag time" between communications. When communication is
instantaneous, as in face-to-face negotiations or a telephone conversation, the
concepts of "transmission" and "receipt" are virtually the same; if the message
is not technically received, as when a phone connection is bad, both parties know
of the failure immediately.
Thus, in deciding whether the mailbox rule should apply to EDI transactions,
the drafters of proposed section 2-208(a) had to decide whether EDI more closely
resembled instantaneous communication, such as a telephone conversation, or
"lag time" communication, such as a mailed writing. The drafters, following the
example of other bodies who had previously considered the question, 3 chose to
treat EDI the same as an instantaneous communication, and thus to make
acceptance conditional upon receipt by the offeror.5 4
This division of risks is proper given the reliability and the speed of EDI
communication. Because the offeree knows immediately whether her message
has arrived or has failed to arrive depending on the other computer's return of the
proper functional acknowledgment, there is no risk of failure of receipt to
allocate, and so the drafters implemented the logical rule, that a document is not
effective until receipt."5
III. THE AGENCY PARADIGM

The drafters of the July 12-19, 1996 version of Article 2 have carefully
considered and arrived at appropriate solutions to nearly all the problems that
EDI poses for the current Article 2 provisions on contract formation. With the
exception of the reversal of the mailbox rule in proposed section 2-208(a), the
Article 2 drafters have kept faith with longstanding concepts such as "writing"
while extending them to encompass technological developments. Similarly, the
drafters have begun to conceive of the capacity of computers to enter into
transactions without human awareness of the transaction having been formed in
terms of "electronic agency." Proposed section 2-102(19) defines "electronic
agent" as follows: "'Electronic agent' means a computer program designed,

52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981). This rule rested on a policy

balance of which party should bear the risk of an acceptance failing to reach the offeror; the
common law decided that, because an offeror controls the terms of the offer she could make
acceptance conditional upon receipt; if the offeror fails to do that which is in her power, she
should bear the risk. ARTHUR LINToN CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrs:

ONE VOLUME EDITION

§ 78 (1952).
53. See, e.g., Report and Model Agreement, supra note 2, at 1664-73.
54. July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft,supra note 1, § 2-208(a).

55. However, this rule does not work unless the offeror is requiredto send a functional
acknowledgment; if this were not so, then lack of receipt of a functional acknowledgment
would signify nothing to the offeree. That is why most industry standards require parties to
send functional acknowledgments promptly. Report and Model Agreement, supra note 2, at
1667. Given this condition upon the instantaneous nature of EDI communication, the drafters
coull strengthen proposed § 2-208(a) by requiring the receiver of a message to send a
functional acknowledgment immediately upon receipt. The receiver could program such a task
for performance by computer so that constant human monitoring would be unnecessary.

1997]

COMPUTERSAS AGENTS

selected, or programmed by a party to initiate or respond to electronic messages
or performances without review by an individual. An electronic agent acts within
the scope of its agency if its performance is consistent with the functions
intended by the party who utilizes the electronic agent. '56 However, the drafters
have taken too tentative and limited an approach to the use of the concept of
electronic agents: "Courts may ultimately conclude that an electronic agent is
equivalent in all respects to a human agent, but this Draft does not go so far,
57
making specific provisions relating to electronic agents when needed." As
demonstrated below, the choices made by the Article 2 drafters regarding
electronic contracting are most comprehensible when the whole is considered in
terms of electronic agents; the so-far limited approach to electronic agency by the
drafters does not go far enough in helping commercial actors, their attorneys, and
judges fully appreciate the legal consequences of electronic contracting. The
drafters should extend the concept of electronic agency to all electronic
contracting provisions if the law is to allow EDI technology to reach its full
potential in efficiency. 8
Applying rudimentary agency principles to the provisions of proposed Article
2 dealing with contract formation in the absence of human involvement, and
conceptualizing the computer as the agent of a party, is the best way to grasp the
choices made by the drafters of the new Article 2. Indeed, the provisions
discussed below dealing with EDI's capability to form a contract without human
awareness or consent reach precisely the same results as agency law would reach
if applied to the computers which enter into the contracts.
In other words, when a commercial actor uses computers in the capacity that
it uses other tools, the law should treat the computers in the same manner as it
treats those other tools. Thus, when a human actor uses a computer merely as a
medium to send a message to another human actor, the computer functions in the
same way that a fax machine or a posted letter does. However, when a principal
uses a computer in the same manner that it uses a human agent, then the law
59
should treat the computer in the same manner that it treats the human agent.
Whether the tracking of the rules of agency in the proposed provisions dealing
6
with "no human input" contracts ("NHI contracts") was intentional or not,"
conceptualizing the proposed provisions in this way should be a fruitful way for
commercial actors, their attorneys, and judges to understand the provisions. First
of all, just as certain qualities of EDI transmissions allow them to serve the same

56. July 12-19,Art. 2 Draft,supra note 1, § 2-102(19).
57. Sept. 4 Art. 2B Draft,supranote 1, § 2B-102 cmt. 12.
58. As an example of how current law impedes EDI technology from reaching its maximum
potential benefit for business, one may note the number of companies which produce paper
backups of EDI contracts to ensure that they have met the "writing" requirement of § 2-201.
Such a practice is needlessly duplicative and removes the "paperless" advantages EDI is
supposed to provide. Report and Model Agreement, supra note 2, at 1680. However, the
Report also notes that such practices are slowly being phased out. Id. at 1658 n.39.
59. The agency principles that are implicit in the proposed Article 2 provisions are more
specifically identified infra part III.
60. The emergence in the last few months of an explicit recognition of such an entity as an
electronic agent by the drafters of Article 2 suggests that such tracking was intentional.
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enforceability and authenticity concerns as paper-based contracts and thus should
be treated the same under the law as those paper-based contracts, computers
serve the same function in NHI contracts that human agents do in traditional
contracts and thus should be treated the same under the law as those human
agents. Second, provisions that, because of their unique wording, seem to be
entirely new solutions to new problems might be at greater risk of
misinterpretation by commercial actors and courts than they would be if the
commercial actors and courts see that old principles of law such as agency are de
facto being applied to deal with problems raised by new technology.
A. Limitations ofthe Agency Paradigm
As to the contention above that computers serve the identical function in NHI
contracts as human agents serve in traditional contracts and thus should be
governed by the same rules of agency, the limitations of such a theory must be
noted at the outset. Only a small portion of the whole of agency law is applicable
to computers. Likewise, only computers which serve the contracting function in
the Article 2 context should be subject to agency law; computers that serve
merely as media of communication should not. The parts of agency law that this
Note argues should apply to computers participating in NHI contracts are the
parts that deal with agents qua agents; the parts of agency law that deal with
agents as humans (the part, for instance, relating to breach of duty of the agent
to the principal) are insensible as applied to computers. A human agent has many
non-agent features to his or her existence. Human agents may misunderstand the
directions given them by their principals. Human agents may be improperly
influenced by persons other than their principals, and may choose of their own
free will to disregard the instructions of their principals. These non-agent
features of human agents are the reasons why law dealing with duties of agents
to their principals is necessary.
Computer agents, however, have no independent existence outside of their
capacity as agents. 6 They perform precisely as instructed by the principal, and
do nothing when not following programmed instructions. Short of a systems
error, a computer does not deviate, either intentionally or unintentionally, from
the instructions given it by the principal.62 Indeed, the accuracy of computers,
and their ability to follow directions precisely, makes them arguably better suited
to the role of agent, in the limited circumstances posited here, than humans.
Because computers programmed to enter into NHI contracts perform this limited
agency function at least as well as humans (and the data on error reduction after
implementation of EDI suggests that computers perform the agency function

61. This assertion is not entirely complete. Computers, when not serving as agents in the
formation of NHI contracts, might be used by the principal as a tool, the same way the principal
would use fax machines or staplers as tools. However, this independent existence still depends
on the manipulation of the computer by a human actor; the independent existence of a human
agent is driven by the autonomy of the agent. Thus, a computer's independent existence is not
analogous to the independent existence of a human agent of a party.
62. Of course, it makes no sense to speak of computers as having "intent" at all as an
original matter.
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better than humans)6" it makes sense to construe the rules dealing with NHI
contracts as treating computers as the legal equivalent of human agents.
There are limitations as well on the contention that commercial actors and
courts are less likely to misinterpret the new provisions if they are understood in
terms of agency than if they are read as entirely new solutions to problems raised
by a new technology. Foremost among the limitations is that the new provisions
are clear enough that the risk of misinterpretation is minimal. Nevertheless, the
agency paradigm in this instance might serve as an additional aid to greater
understanding of the new provisions. Even if the risk of misinterpretation is
minimal, there is always the chance that a sudden change in the law will produce
unwanted and unforeseen side effects. The law can avoid such side effects if it
explicitly recognizes that the "new laws" are nothing more 64than extensions of
existing, familiar law analogized to apply to new situations.
B. Specifics of the Agency Paradigm
Having made the above general observations, we may now turn to a survey of
the specific agency principles that the drafters have both explicitly and implicitly
incorporated into the proposed Article 2 provisions on contract formation.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency ("The Restatement") defines "agency"
as follows: "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.",61 If one leaves aside
problems of the intent of the agent to enter into the relationship ("consent by the
other") for the moment, 66 the essence of the definition, "the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control," describes the situation where a principal
programs a computer to perform in a certain way in the future as well as it
describes the situation where a principal instructs a human agent to perform in
a certain way in the future. The computer, in sending out a purchase order, is
clearly acting on the principal's behalf; in following preprogrammed instructions
on when and how much to order, the computer is acting subject to the principal's
control.

63. See Boss, supra note 2, at 294.
64. The very nature of unforeseeable side effects of laws makes it impossible to cite an
example here of unforeseeable side effects of the electronic contract formation provisions in
proposed Article 2. However, one commentator has noted a previously unforeseen side effect
of another proposed computer contracting law. See Fry, supra note 25, at 616. Professor Fry
notes that under Articles 3 and 7, paper writings and electronic transmissions do not serve
precisely identical functions. They both indeed serve authentication, communication, and ritual
functions, but paper writings serve an additional function that electronic transmissions cannot
serve. Under Articles 3 and 7, the paper writing itself often serves as the res of a transaction.
Professor Fry notes that completely replacing the definition of "writing" with one that allows
for electronic transmissions for all purposes would cause turmoil and uncertainty in the way
in which business is done currently under Articles 3 and 7. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). The Restatement also offers the
following supplemental definitions: (1) principal: "The one for whom action is to be taken,"
and (2) agent: "The one who is to act." Id.
66. See discussion infrapart V.A.
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To be precise, one would more accurately consider the computer a subagent of
the principal. The Restatement defines "subagent" as follows: "[A] person
appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions undertaken by
the agent for the principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the
principal to be primarily responsible. '6 7 Indeed, the human agent who programs
the computer to send out a purchase order upon the happening of a certain event
(such as depletion of inventory below a certain level) will be more than just
"primarily" responsible for an error in instruction.
To be still more precise, one would more accurately consider the computer a
general agent of the principal as well. General agents' duties involve a continuity
of service in the sense that they are expected to perform a series of similar
transactions for the principal without the necessity of receiving particular
instructions every time the principal desires a transaction.68 This concept is
consistent with the commercial actor's practice of programming computers to
send out a purchase order whenever the inventory of a certain kind of good falls
below a certain level; indeed, if the law required the commercial actor to program
the computer to send out a purchase order each particular time that a good was
needed, then the computer would cease to be performing the functions of an
agent and instead would merely serve as a tool or a medium of communication
manipulated by a human agent.
The kind of authority a computer agent has to act on behalf of its principal
most closely resembles actual authority. Computers do not (yet) have the
capability to do anything without a human first instructing them; thus, the idea
that authority is actual only when the principal instructs the agent 9 perfectly
describes the way the principal/computer agent relationship works.
The capacity of the agent to bind the principal is also applicable to the issue
of computer agency, but in a limited manner. To the extent that the capacity of
the agent determines the liability of the agent under traditional law,"0 the concept
of capacity does not apply to computer agents. If one applies the principle

67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(l) (1958).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3(1) (1958). The precise definition reads: "A
general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions involving a continuity
of service." Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958) reads: "Authority is the power of the
agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to him." The concept of authority flowing from explicit
instructions given by the principal to the agent is expressed thus: "[A]uthority to do an act can
be created by written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably
interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act on the principal's
account." Id. § 26. A principal's instructions to a computer agent obviously are not the product
of "written or spoken words" but rather "other conduct." The standard for when authority is
created under § 26, when the authority "reasonably ... causes the agent to believe that the
principal desires him ... to act," would not directly apply to computer agents, but the
instructions given a computer agent are so precise and explicit that they would pass any kind
of "reasonable person" test if the same were given to a human agent.
70. Id. § 21 (1958).
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discussed above,"' the concept of personal liability of an agent is a part of agency
law directed to the human aspect of agents, and is not addressed to the functional
aspect of agents as agents. Assuming that the only parts of agency law relevant
to the question of computer agents are the parts relating solely to the functions
an agent serves for its principal, one must conclude that the part of the capacity
concept relating to the liability of the agent is irrelevant.
The part of the capacity concept that distinctly fits the agency model of NHI
contracts is the part dealing with capacity to receive and convey. "[A]ny human
being who has the capacity to receive and, in a contract situation, the capacity to
'
convey ideas, can bind another by acting as his.., agent."72
If one sets aside the
technical inapplicability of the above statement to those that are not "human
beings," the essential requirements of capacity are met by a computer as well as
a human. Computers do have the capacity to receive ideas-even those
functioning merely as tools and not as agents possess this capacity. Computers
likewise have the technical capacity to convey ideas (data) as instructed "in a
contract situation." Indeed, as seen in the discussion below of the proposed
provisions of Article 2, the drafters wish to explicitly give computers in NHI
contracts the legal capacity to bind commercial actors through the reception and
conveyance of ideas (data).73
The above survey of agency law demonstrates that the core principles of
agency law apply to computers in the context of NHI contracts as well as they do
to human agents in other contracting contexts. The following section will apply
these core agency principles to explain why the drafters of revised Article 2 made
certain choices when dealing with electronic contracting issues.74 Finally, some
problems with the agency model will be discussed.
IV. THE AGENCY PARADIGM APPLIED TO "NEW"
ARTICLE Two

The remainder of the electronic contracting provisions (aside from those
dealing with VANs) falls into the category of provisions which one may
conceptualize as those involving the concept of "electronic agents." These
include proposed sections 2-102(28) and 2-102(30), defining "manifests assent"
and "opportunity to review," respectively; proposed section 2-102(36) defining
"signed"; proposed section 2-208 entitled "Electronic Transactions: Formation";
and proposed section 2-212 entitled "Electronic Messages: Attribution." The

71. See supra text accompanying note 62. This principle states that only the parts of agency
law dealing with agents as agents (as opposed to agents as humans) should apply to electronic
agents.
72. HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP 22 (1979).

73. July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft, supra note 1,§ 2-208(b).
74. An additional agency principle, a British common law concept called "innocent
agency," will be necessary to explain the choices made in proposed section 2-102(36). The
application of this principle to NHI contracting will be explained in the discussion of that
provision.
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discussion of the agency paradigm will begin with proposed section 2-208(b),75
the provision that explicitly allows legal recognition of NHI contracts.
A. ProposedSection 2-208(b) as the Establishment ofthe
BroadAgency Paradigm
Proposed section 2-208(b) deals with the manner in which parties may form
binding contracts in the absence of any human awareness on either party's part.76
This provision is the basis upon which the drafters build all the other computer
contracting provisions. The first sentence makes explicit the idea that no
"individual" awareness on the part of either party is necessary for the law to find
that the parties made a binding contract. There is a faulty parallelism in the
second sentence, as becomes evident when it is read: "when received in aform
[capable ofprocessing the record] and at a location capable of processing the
record ... ."" The intended meaning of the "form" clause is probably "a form
capable of being processed." This reading of the provision would indicate that
an electronic message sent by one party cannot have any effect on the other in an
NHI setting unless the message is sent in such a manner that it arrives at a
computer capable of processing the information, and unless it complies with the
standards which will allow the receiving computer to analyze the data contained
therein.7" Faulty parallelism aside, the effect of the provision is to make the
contract enforceable as ifhuman agents had exchanged the information
constituting the agreement. The first sentence gives legal recognition to NHI
contracts, and the drafters need not alter it. Because computers instead of humans
are the actors which analyze the data and come to a binding agreement, I suggest
the second sentence would be clearer if it were understood to mean the
following: Electronic records exchanged in an electronic transaction are effective
when received by an electronic agent of the receiving party.
This provision would apply only to contracts formed by computers in the NHI
context; as discussed above, 79 this is the only context in which computers

75. The discussion of the agency paradigm actually begins with the definition of "electronic
agent" in proposed section 2-102(19). However, the drafters have hewed to their decision to
limit the potentially broad effects of this concept by explicitly referring to electronic agents in
only one other provision, proposed section 2-208(a). See supra note 50. The discussion that
follows deals with what can be termed the "broad agency paradigm," which is this Note's
proposal to clarify the electronic contracting provisions by explicitly incorporating the concept
of electronic agency into each of them.
76. Proposed section 2-208(b) reads as follows:
A contract is created under subsection (a) even if no individual representing either
party was aware of or reviewed the initial message or response or the action
manifesting acceptance of the contract. Electronic records exchanged in an
electronic transaction are effective when received in a form and at a location
capable of processing the record even if no individual is aware of their receipt.
July 12-19.Art. 2 Draft, supra note 1, § 2-208(b).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. The notion that the message is not effective until received comports with the choice
made to abandon the mailbox rule in 2-208(a). See supra part II.B.
79. See supra note 61.
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function as agents rather than as mere tools of a party. This rewriting emphasizes
that computers are not mere "locations capable of processing," but are the actual
processors, just as human agents are the processors in more traditional contract
formation situations. Casting computers in this light allows the commercial actor
to see that the electronic contracting provisions do not radically alter the legal
structure within which it is accustomed to working. A record will be effective
when received by an electronic agent just as an offer will be effective when made
to a human agent in a face-to-face communication. Legally, these two scenarios
will have the same effect under proposed section 2-208(b); the above rewriting
of the proposed provision would enable commercial actors to see this
equivalence more clearly. The utility of such a rewriting of proposed section 2208(b) can be demonstrated by observing the effect upon other provisions in
proposed Article 2.
B. ProposedSection 2-212 and "Computer" Attribution
Proposed section 2-212 deals with the times when a party may fairly attribute
to another party an electronic message purporting to be from that other party. 0
Subsection (1) is straightforward, binding the "initiating" party to the terms of
the message if the party or a human agent of the party in fact sent the message to
the recipient. The purpose of subsection (2) with regard to messages sent by
human agents is unclear. What is clear is that the focus of subsection (1) is on
the initiating party; the focus of subsection (2) is on the recipient's perception
of having received a message from the initiating party. Assuming for the moment
that subsection (2) applies only to human agents, the subsection's practical effect
is to include only a few more scenarios than subsection (1) does. Subsection (2)
-includes those instances when the recipient concludes that the message was sent
by the human agent of the initiating party and it was actually sent by the human
agent of the initiating party (in which case the scenario is already covered under
subsection (1)); subsection (2) also includes those instances when the recipient
concludes that the message was sent by the human agent of the initiating party
but it was not sent by the human agent of the initiating party. If the message was
not sent by the human agent of the initiating party but the circumstances in
subsection (2) were fulfilled, subsection (2) would seemingly bind the initiating
party to fraudulent messages. The drafters cannot have intended to bind a party
to any message sent by a hacker who has cracked the authentication code of a

80. The pertinent provisions of proposed section 2-212 read as follows:
If an electronic message is sent to another party, as between the party indicated in
the message as the initiating party and the party receiving the message, the party
described as the initiating party is bound by the terms of the message if:
(1) the message was sent by that party or a person who had authority to act on
behalf of that party in reference to such messages; [or]
(2) by properly applying a procedure previously agreed to by the parties for
purposes of authentication, the recipient concluded that the message was
originated by, or otherwise attributable to, the initiating party[.]
July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft, supra note 1, § 2-212 (Subsection 3 is irrelevant to the present
discussion.).
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party and then sent out messages claiming to be from the party. It is doubtful that
any court would so construe the statute to bind a party to a message sent through
the fraud of another. Moreover, a similhr rule does not exist for nonelectronic
messages; it is difficult to discern a reason why such a rule should only apply to
electronic messages.
There is an alternative reading of proposed section 2-212(2), though, that is
consistent with proposed section 2-208(b)'s mandate that NHI contracts are
binding on the parties. If one reads the provision as binding a party to a message
when no human agent of the party has sent it, yet it is properly authenticated as
having come from the party, then the meaning of the provision is simply that a
computer may send a properly authenticated message and bind a party just as
surely as if a human agent had sent it. If one rules out the possibility that a forged
electronic message can bind the "initiating" party, then the meaning of proposed
section 2-212(2) can only be that messages sent by a party's computer can be
fairly attributed to that party by the recipient.
The above analysis demonstrates that the meaning of proposed section 2212(2) is not immediately clear. It suggests that the drafters could make the
provision more comprehensible to commercial actors, their attorneys, and judges,
and the provision would still arrive at the same results as the current proposal,
if the drafters applied the broad agency paradigm. Indeed, the whole of proposed
section 2-212(2) could be eliminated, and its purpose served, by rewriting
proposed section 2-212(1) thus: "The party described as the initiating party is
bound by the terms of the message ifthe message was sent by that party or by a
party's human or electronic agent which had authority or was instructed to act on
behalf of that party in reference to such messages." The meaning of the provision
is immediately clear: regardless of whether a message purporting to come from
a party was sent by a human agent of the party or by that party's computer, the
recipient may treat the message as one that is properly authenticated and valid.
The reconceptualizafion of section 2-208(b) in the previous section has helped
to make another proposed provision more comprehensible.
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C. ProposedSections 2-102(28) and (30) and
"Intentless" Assent
The definitions of "manifests assent" and "opportunity to review"'" have no
corollaries in the current version of the Code.82 Both definitions carefully avoid
requiring any kind of present intention to assent, or any kind of actual
opportunity for a human agent of the party to review the terms of the agreement.
The very term "manifests assent" suggests that actual assent is not what the law
seeks, but rather the appearanceof a party's assent to an outside observer. The
only requirements are that the party "engage[] in conduct that ... constitutes
assent," and that the party "ha[ve] an opportunity to decline to engage in the
conduct." If the provision required actual assent, then computers programmed to
perform contract formation tasks could not meet the assent requirement.
Computers can, however, engage in conduct that appears to be assent, which is
all this provision requires. By deleting any intent requirement, then, the drafters
of the provision expand the concept of assent to encompass computer
contracting.
Likewise, proposed section 2-102(30) defines "opportunity to review" in such
a way that even if no human agent of the party had the opportunity to review a
record, a court could find that a computer had such an opportunity. The record
need only be "made available [to the party] in a manner designed to call the terms
83The record is not actually required to call the
to the attention of the party ...
terms to the attention of the party; it merely need be "made available ... in a
manner designedto call the terms to the attention of the party."84 The second of
the provision's disjunctive requirements indicates that a party might also have
had an "opportunity to review" a record if the record is "provided in such a
manner that the terms will be conspicuous ... ." Again, there is no requirement
that anyone from the receiving party be aware of the conspicuous terms; the
sending party must only provide the record so that it is "conspicuous in the

81. The definition of "manifests assent" appears in proposed section 2-102(28), and reads
as follows:
A party "manifests assent' to a record if, after having an opportunity to review the
terms of the record, the party engages in conduct that under the circumstances
constitutes acceptances [sic] of the terms of the record and the party had an
opportunity to decline to engage in the conduct.
July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft,supra note 1, § 2-102(28).
The definition of "opportunity to review" appears in proposed section 2-102(30), and reads
as follows:
A party has the "opportunity to review" a record if the record is made available in
a manner designed to call the terms to the attention [of] the party before assent to
the record or is provided in such a manner that the terms will be conspicuous in
the normal course of initial use or preparation to use the goods.
Id. § 2-102(30).
82. U.C.C. (1994).
83. July 12-19.Art. 2 Draft,supra note 1, § 2-102(30).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
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normal course of initial use . . . ."" Of course, as discussed in Part I.A., the
"normal course of initial use" involves NHI contracts in greater numbers every
year.86
Again, these provisions arrive at the same result as if the law considered
computers to be agents of a party. Supposing that the definitions allowed assent
"by any human or electronic agent designated to give such assent to a record,"
and an opportunity to review "by any human or electronic agent designated to
undertake such a review," the results reached would be the same as those reached
under the current proposed provisions: the law will consider a party to have
assented and to have reviewed a record even if a computer performed the only
assent or review undertaken by the party, with no human involvement. Thus, the
provisions need not go to such lengths to write out any element of "intent"; by
explicitly saying that computer agents may create binding contracts in proposed
section 2-208(b), the requirement of intent of the agent is already implicitly
removed.87
The provisions discussed to this point have admitted to interpretation using the
agency paradigm based only upon the rudimentary agency principles set out in
Part II.B. When reinterpreted or rewritten with these principles in mind, the
provisions reach the same results as they do currently written. One can also
explain the next discussed provision in terms of agency rules, but this discussion
requires the introduction of an additional principle of agency. The next provision
has already been discussed in the context of EDI authentication as a signature,
proposed section 2-102(36).
D. ProposedSection 2-102(36) and "InnocentAgency"
The current definition of "signed" in section 1-201(39) is virtually identical to
the first sentence of the definition of "signed" found in proposed section 2102(36) with the exception that the word "means" is substituted for the word
"includes." 88 The main difference between the provisions is the second sentence
of proposed section 2-102(36) dealing with "signed" electronic records. 9 The
purpose of a traditional signature and an electronic signature is identical: to
authenticate the record in which the signature appears." However, a study of the
provision reveals that what it says with regard to traditional signatures it says

85. Id.
86. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
87. The limited nature of the current proposal's approach to electronic agency is manifested
again in the Reporter's Notes to the definition of "opportunity to review" contained in
proposed section 2B- 113: "Importantly, these concepts do not substitute for 'agreement' as that
term is defined in the U.C.C. or in contract law generally. Assent and review are typically
associated here with what terms become part of the contract." Sept. 4 Art. 2B Draft, supra note
1, § 2B-113. However, as demonstrated, these provisions can and should be extended to
include an electronic agent's capacity to enter into a binding agreement.
88. U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1994); July 12-19 Art. 2 Draft, supra note 1, § 2-102(36).
89. The text of this provision is reprinted above. See supra note 35.
90. For a discussion of this provision in the context of EDI transmissions as "signed
writings," see supra part II.A. The current discussion focuses on the identity of the signer.
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with economy of words, straightforwardly listing the requirements of a signature;
the provision on electronic authentication has no such simplicity. A traditional
signature must be (1) a symbol; (2) executed or adopted; (3) by a party; (4) with
present intention; (5) to authenticate; (6) a writing.9 Like the definitions in
proposed sections 2-102(28) and (30) discussed above, the definition of
electronic authentication pointedly contains no reference to present intention,
and thus requires a lot of language to convey the elements of such authentication
without "intent." Again, one can interpret this circumlocution as the effort by the
drafters to accommodate authentications executed by a computer with no human
input. However, the drafters once again could have reached the same result in a
much simpler and more comprehensible manner had they drafted the provision
with agency principles in mind. When one measures computer-executed
authentication element for element against the elements of a traditional signature,
it becomes evident that the "present intention" element is the only one that is
problematic and must be the only reason for introducing the convoluted second
sentence of the provision. The first element, a "symbol," is met by computer
authentication, or could be with small modification. Often the mode of computer
authentication is a symbol such as a code key; even when it is not, as when the
mode of authentication chosen is encryption, a small alteration in the element is
all that is needed to encompass computer authentication. The drafters could
accomplish this modification by changing the phrase "any symbol executed or
adopted" to "any mode of authentication executed or adopted." The purpose is
the same, but the proposed change is broad enough to encompass computer
authentication.
The second and third elements of a traditional signature, that it be "[2]
executed or adopted [3] by a party," are met just as well by computer
authentication as they are by traditional signatures. The fourth element, "[4]
present intention," is, as noted above, the problematic element and will thus be
discussed in depth below. The last two elements, "[5] to authenticate [6] a
record" are again met just as well by computer authentication as they are by
traditional signatures.
We return to "present intention" to discuss it in terms of the agency paradigm,
and to evaluate the way in which a court might find a party's present intention
to authenticate in a computer record authenticated without any human awareness.
The starting point of the discussion is a Latin maxim cited in an agency text:
"Quifacitper aliumfacitper se. (He who acts through another, himself acts.)."'
The essence of this maxim is that one who designates an agent to represent him
or her or to perform an action can be said himselfto be presently acting when the
agent performs the designated action. If this were not the intent of the maxim, the
conclusion, "himself acts," would not have been expressed in the present tense.
In like manner, if a principal has instructed an agent to perform a certain task and
the agent subsequently performs the task, one can fairly say that the agent has
exercised the principal's present intention to perform the task. Thus, if a party
programs its computer to authenticate a record in a manner selected by the party

91. See U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1994).
92. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 72, at 1.
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for that purpose, and has not given the computer any contrary authentication
instructions in the interim, the party's intention to use that method of
authentication "to authenticate a record" stretches into the present and a court
may consider it the party's "present intention." If this is the case, the first
sentence of proposed section 2-102(36) would apply to all methods of
authentication, including computer authentication in NHI contracts, and the
whole of the second sentence could be jettisoned as surplus. Even when a
computer "authenticates" a record without human knowledge, one could say that
the party who owns the computer "presently intended" to authenticate the record
when the computer authenticates the record according to the party's instructions.
One can find support for this method of thinking about "present intention" in
a British common law concept called innocent agency. Innocent agency is a
concept found in the criminal law of England, but the principles can apply to
computer agents' contract formation as well. Briefly, innocent agency is a
doctrine developed to deal with the situation where a principal employs an agent
whom the principal instructs to engage in criminal conduct. The agent in innocent
agency is an actor who cannot himself be prosecuted for the crime committed in
the capacity of an agent.93 For example, the agent could be a minor or an
animal.94 In prosecuting the principal for crimes committed by his agents,
prosecutors must prove the element of mens rea, or, restated, present intention."
Such a requirement might cause potential problems if, at the time the agent
committed the crime, the principal were sleeping or were thinking of something
other than the crime;96 the law circumvents this problem by "bringing together
the mental state of one person [the principal] with the acts of another [the
agent]."97 The law in essence attributes the principal's intention to the principal
at the time the agent takes the action.98 The extension of a principal's intent to the
time when the agent takes action meets the present intention requirement for a

93. See Peter Alldridge, The Doctrine ofInnocent Agency, 2 CRIM. L.F. 45, 45-46 (1990).
94. The example cited by one scholar is that of the young thieves in Charles Dickens's
novel Oliver Twist: "When Fagin sends Twist [aged under 10] to steal handkerchiefs, Fagin
'appropriates' a handkerchief, within the meaning of the Theft Act, at the moment when Twist
takes it." GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 316 (1978).

95. "[I]n a prosecution against the accessory [principal], it is the latter's culpability that is
relevant; the perpetrator's [agent's] culpability is incidental." GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 642 (1978). Translating the concept into computer agency terms,

the principal's intent is the relevant one. The agent's intent has no legal significance.
96. Alldridge, supra note 93, at 57.
97. Id.
98. Alldridge favors, rather than innocent agency, a slightly different yet related doctrine,
termed "broad accessorial liability." Rather than relying on what he calls the "dogma" of
innocent agency, Alldridge supports a theory in which "guilt can be established without resort
to the fiction that the act of the agent is the act of the [principal].... [T]he act of the agent [is]
a (generally intended... ) consequence of the act of the [principal]." Id. at 54.
Alldridge's theory of accessorial liability attributes to the principal those acts of the agent
which the principal "contemplated." Id. at 59. Analogizing to the situation where a computer
is ap agent, one finds that all acts which a principal instructs a computer to do are contemplated
by le principal, including authentication of documents. Thus, by authenticating a message as
contemplated by its principal, a computer exercises the intent of the principal.
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valid "signature" under proposed section 2-102(36) when a computer
authenticates a record according to the principal's previous instructions, even
without any human awareness of the action at the time the computer executes the
action.
The end result of applying the agency paradigm to this provision could be:
"'Signed' means any mode of authentication executed or alopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a record. An electionic agent that so
authenticates a record is presumed to exercise its principal's present intention."
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE AGENCY PARADIGM

A. "Consent" as an Element of the Creationof a
Principal-AgentRelationship
As well as the agency paradigm works to explain the choices made by the
drafters of the electronic contracting provisions in Article 2, one must note that
the paradigm breaks down at the moment of the creation of the principal-agent
relationship. To create a principal-agent relationship under agency law, the
consent of both parties is necessary." In a principal-computer agent relationship,
the concept of the computer consenting is absurd. Though the agency paradigm
works well-after the moment of the creation of the relationship, that is-this
blip in the theory is problematic. There is no way to circumnavigate it without the
use of a presumption or a legal fiction of consent, at least until the technology of
artificial intelligence has advanced significantly enough to warrant saying that
a computer has consented (and then Article 2 issues will be the least of the law's
concerns).
B. Computers as Persons Under the Law
A more significant philosophical problem is the problem presented when there
is a call to treat computers as persons under the law, even if the treatment is as
limited as that proposed in this Note. The fundamental questions concerning
artificial intelligence and its potential to rival human awareness and autonomy
are significant, and no one is near ready to extend law applicable to persons so
that it covers computers as well. Such an extension would inevitably lead to the
devaluation of what it means to be human.
Two responses are available for those disturbed by the suggestion that agency
law should be extended to include computers. The first is a literalist response.
This Note has not argued that the law should treat computers as people; it has
argued that the law should treat computers as ifthey were people. This response,
relying as it does on a technicality, is not a satisfying response to so profound an
objection. The following incomplete, yet expanded, response should address the
concerns of those who object to even limited treatment of computers as persons
under the law.

99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
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The proposals set forth in this Note are not based upon rules that treat people
as people, but rather are based upon rules that treat people as objects or agents
of another person. The principles of agency extended to computers in the agency
paradigm are only those that deal with agents as agents, that is, as entities doing
the will of a human principal. The aspects of agency law that deal with agents as
persons, that is, rules setting out the duties of agent to principal or of principal
to agent which involve consideration of other aspects of an agent than its
capacity to do the bidding of another, have been intentionally omitted from the
agency paradigm set forth in this Note. In a sense, then, this Note has not argued
that laws treating human agents as humans should be extended to computers, and
thus cannot be said to have applied to computers laws dealing with people. In the
context of laws dealing solely with the functional aspects of agents, the only
human who is significant is the principal who directs the agent's action. Because
it has not been argued that computers can be principals, there should not be an
insoluble philosophical difficulty in extending rudimentary agency principles to
computers as argued above.
CONCLUSION

This Note has presented a case for reconceptualizing the proposed electronic
contracting provisions to Article 2 of the U.C.C., using the proposed definition
of "electronic agent" as the basis for this reconceptualization. When computers
are given the capacity to communicate with each other based upon
preprogrammed instructions, and when they possess the physical capability to
execute agreements on shipments of goods without any human awareness or
input into the agreements beyond the original programming of the computer's
instructions, these computers serve the same function as similarly instructed
human agents of a party and thus should be treated under the law identically to
those human agents. This Note has applied this principle to the proposed
electronic contracting provisions, and it has demonstrated that many provisions
would be simplified, and would arrive at the same substantive results, as they do
in their present formulation.
This Note has proposed actual revisions to some of the provisions in the July
12-19, 1996 draft of Article 2. Failing that, the principles set forth here may be
helpful for commercial actors, their attorneys, and judges to conceptualize these
electronic contracting provisions. The agency analogies might thus serve a
purpose as commentary regarding the provisions. Finally, if the drafters
eventually reject the current approach as set forth in the July 12-19, 1996 draft
of Article 2 in favor of some other approach, the agency paradigm discussed here
might serve as a guide to some of the considerations that the drafters must make.

